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1. Introduction 
The aim of Chiaro and Nocella’s article (2004) which has been much quoted by 
Franz Pöchhacker in this issue, was not to boast their competence in slick and 
sophisticated statistical techniques. Neither was it to be excessively harsh on 
researchers who were, after all, pioneers in bringing survey techniques to 
Interpreting Studies (IS) in the first place. Chiaro and Nocella’s aim, 
nonetheless, was to underscore a certain lackadaisical attitude rampant in 
several attempts at questionnaire based quality research (QBQR) in this field. 
However, as Pöchhacker casts doubts on the reliability of their study, the 
authors cannot do otherwise but jump to their own defence1. In fact, much as 
Pöchhacker’s re-elaboration of existing data does him honour (this issue: 150-
154), as we intend to demonstrate in this essay, it cannot, and indeed does not 
disguise the existing general lack of methodological expertise and rigour present 
in many attempts at QBQR in IS. Furthermore, while grateful to Pöchhacker for 
having pointed out a series of shortcomings in their work, Chiaro and Nocella 
wish to accept total responsibility for each and every weakness, rather than take 
refuge behind the shield of poor refereeing. Presumably all attempts at research 
have their strengths and weaknesses. What is important is that the latter do not 
outnumber the former, otherwise our incessant quest for knowledge could well 
go awry. 
Moreover, the present authors would like to highlight the fact that they are 
flattered to see that their infinitesimal contribution to the field has triggered off 
an animated response by such an eminent scholar. In fact, Chiaro and Nocella 
                                                          
1 The authors are grateful to the editorial board of The Interpreters’ Newsletter for 
having given them the opportunity to respond and go into print in the same issue in 
which Franz Pöchhacker’s article appears. The editorial decision to allow two lesser 
known researchers to respond so openly to such a renowned scholar is evidence of 
transparency and a true credit to the journal. Furthermore, they would also like to 
express their appreciation of Pöchhacker’s sense of fair play and sportsmanship for 
having given them prior access to his critique and consequently the opportunity to 
elaborate the present reply. 
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believe that IS could benefit from some lively, albeit constructive discussion, a 
common practice in other scientific discourse communities but, until now, rather 
lacking in this one. In other words, with the present discussion, the authors 
welcome the opportunity to defend their work and intend, good heartedly, not 
only to stick to their guns, but also (hopefully) to trigger off a wider debate.  
Taking Pöchhacker’s re-visiting of QBQR in this issue as a starting point, 
we too will follow the same path and respond to his critique while 
simultaneously providing our own (over)view, where relevant, of other, similar 
existing research. In addition, similarly to Pöchhacker, most of our revisiting 
will also be carried out in practical methodological terms, with special emphasis 
on research hypotheses underlying previous studies, the nature of research 
design and finally statistical procedures for the analysis of survey data. We will 
also (re)visit Pöchhacker’s detailed reanalyses of the work of his colleagues 
Bühler and Kurz and naturally bear out his critique of our own methods, results 
and conclusions. The above argumentation will be arranged in two major 
sections, the first regarding a detailed discussion and defence of what we 
consider to be a series of unjust criticisms of our work brought to light by 
Pöchhacker. In a separate section we will unearth a number of significant flaws 
in the works of others that Pöchhacker appears to have overlooked after which, 
we will attempt to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that our claim that 
“research undertaken so far (in QBQR) is surprisingly lacking in methodo-
logical rigour” (Chiaro and Nocella 2004: 278) is anything but inaccurate. 
However, we feel obliged to underscore the fact that we are not taking issue 
with the worth of research in IS tout court. We are not disputing the wealth of 
existing descriptive and experimental work in the field. Our criticism was 
originally, and still is, limited to QBQR alone.  
Nonetheless, before embarking on this enterprise, the present authors would 
like to begin by seriously challenging the suggestion that survey based research 
offers “a working method that can readily be adopted also by less experienced 
investigators” (Pöchhacker this issue: 143). 
2. A working method for less experienced investigators? 
It would appear that after the well known work of Bühler (1986) and Kurz 
(1989), survey work in IS has become trendy and à la mode as more and more 
researchers jump onto the questionnaire bandwagon (e.g. Meak 1990; 
Vuorikoski 1993; Mack and Cataruzza 1995; Moser 1996; etc.). Yet those who 
think that developing a questionnaire is simply a matter of sitting at a desk and 
thinking up a list of questions are mistaken. Questionnaire development is a 
demanding and challenging process which requires time and energy spent first 
and foremost in preliminary qualitative research methods. These consist of 
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preparatory processes such as setting up and conducting in depth interviews 
and/or focus groups or adopting projective techniques such as association, 
completion, construction or expressive techniques (Malhotra 1996) which 
provide essential input for setting up a survey. A glance at the extensiveness of 
the literature on interview techniques alone can provide us with a fair idea as to 
how far such pre-survey qualitative methods have developed, while closer 
examination reveals how complex such practices actually are (Malhotra 1996; 
Tull and Hawkins 1993). And even if the principal investigator wears two hats 
and is also an experienced practitioner, as often appears to be the case in IS, this 
should not exempt them from this preliminary phase. In a certain sense this 
stage is even more important when the investigator is a practitioner because a 
researcher-cum-practitioner by default may well be inclined to increase the 
“observer’s paradox” (Labov 1972)2 as such a researcher will be even more 
lacking in the psychic distance required for unbiased study.  
Let us now turn to what we shall crudely define the second stage in 
questionnaire design. Once researchers have obtained sufficient input from an 
adequate number of external informants to enable them to outline a 
questionnaire, they will need to know exactly what, as well as how, information 
is to be collected from the population under examination. This may sound trite 
and obvious, yet poor judgment at this stage may lead to results that are not 
relevant to the purpose of the study, or else that are incomplete. Questions 
require choosing the appropriate measurement scales, formatting and careful 
wording, as well as proper sequencing and layout (Aaker et al. 1995: 291); tasks 
which are easier said than done. Less than careful framing of questions can lead 
to distorted results. The following anecdote should illustrate the point we are 
trying to make: 
Two priests, a Dominican and a Jesuit, are talking about whether it is a 
sin to smoke and pray at the same time. After failing to reach a 
conclusion, each goes off to consult his respective superior. The next 
week they meet again: 
“Well, what did your superior say?” asks the Dominican.  
“He said it was all right”, the Jesuit responds. 
“That’s funny”, replies the Dominican, “my superior said it was a sin.” 
“What did you ask him?” inquires the Jesuit. “I asked him if it was all 
right to smoke while praying”’, says the Dominican. 
“Oh,” says the Jesuit, “I asked my superior if it was all right to pray while 
smoking!” (Dillon et al. 1994) 
                                                          
2 We would like to point out that we are not using the term in its strictest Labovian 
meaning but in its broader sense to embrace all types of biases which can occur 
owing to the relationship between researcher and informant. 
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If a mistake occurs in a measurement scale, problems are bound to arise. 
Several drafts as well as extensive piloting are essential before arriving at a final 
version. Once satisfied with the instrument, aspects such as deciding upon a 
method of administration (e.g. face to face, telephone, mail etc.), selecting a 
random3 sample, choosing a priori the statistical technique to test the research 
hypothesis, elaborating raw data and in the final stages, interpreting results are 
not aspects to be taken lightly. We believe that many of the shortcomings 
inherent to many such studies in IS have been due to this very underestimation 
of what designing a survey instrument actually entails. In fact, as far as we 
know, there are no Translation and Interpreting faculties which offer foundation 
courses in empirical research methods at either undergraduate or postgraduate 
level, so it is understandable that interpreters often lack in necessary know how. 
If the single investigator is unable to see beyond data collection they may well 
be walking up a blind alley. Thus investigations involving researchers with 
different types of expertise and the adoption of an interdisciplinary attitude to IS 
research can only be fruitful, as long as the single researchers do not work 
independently and are involved in every single stage of the study. In other 
words, a statistician brought in a posteriori is unhelpful. A statistician (or better, 
a researcher trained in methodology and statistical analysis) at this point will 
indeed be capable of elaborating existing data, but his or her cooperation would 
have been more productive at the stage of research design. What we are trying 
to say is that researchers should already have in mind the kind of statistical tests 
they want to carry out on resulting data in order to test the initial research 
objective before carrying out the survey. “Here’s my data see what you can do 
with it” is out of order in serious empirical research.  
Last but not least, one of Pöchhacker’s many objections to our work is that 
“peer reviewers might have suggested that Chiaro and Nocella include some key 
references in their discussion of methodological issues (e.g. Moser-Mercer 
1996, Shlesinger 1997)” (this issue: 162). With all due respect to the two studies 
which Pöchhacker suggests should have been included in our discussion and 
which apparently slipped the mind of the journal’s referees, we would like to 
state that we preferred to refer the reader to authors specialized in qualitative 
and quantitative research methods (i.e. Aaker et al. 1995; Hair et al. 1995 and 
Schiffman et al. 1981) rather than scholars of interpreting. This was not to 
belittle the two renowned scholars in question but simply because surely it is IS 
which is drawing from well established methodologies of the Social Sciences 
rather than vice-versa. Now what we were suggesting from the start was that IS 
should look more closely at the rules of qualitative and quantitative research 
methods which were born and bred outside this discipline. Interesting as both 
                                                          
3 “A random sample allows a known probability that each elementary unit will be 
chosen.” (Lapin 1990: 104) 
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articles may be, they appear to remain, however, within the somewhat self-
referential boundaries of IS.  
Before beginning our discussion proper, we would like to raise one more 
small issue. Over and over again we read that investigating quality in 
interpreting is not an easy task due to the huge number of variables involved not 
only in the process itself, but also in conditions which regard operators, users 
and even the contractors of the service (e.g. Shlesinger 1997; Garzone 2003 
etc.). The general idea which comes across to the reader is that dealing with the 
enormous heterogeneity of circumstances in and around interpreting verges on 
the insurmountable. This may well be true and we certainly do not wish to claim 
that quality research in IS is unproblematic. But is not apparent insuperability 
typical of scientific enquiry? Was Watson and Crick’s model easy to identify? 
And what of the excogitation of a formula that shows that distance and time are 
not absolute? And discovering penicillin? The list of seemingly intractable 
problems is endless. But is it not this very complexity that is what makes 
research fascinating and irresistible?  
A researcher is a detective or a spy who is out to discover or uncover 
something that is in some way, unnoticed, hidden, secret or problematic. 
Researchers, like detectives, find that their sources sometimes lie, 
sometimes offer conflicting stories, and sometimes behave in baffling 
ways. That is why research is so exciting … (Berger 1991: 7). 
2.1. A harsh critique or calling a spade a spade? 
Pöchhacker accuses Chiaro and Nocella of offering a “rather harsh critique” of 
the work of his Viennese colleagues Bühler (1986) and Kurz (1989). We hereby 
express regret for our lack of tact and for having couched our criticism harshly. 
Our exact words were: “Unfortunately, a substantial shortcoming of this 
particular study (Bühler) is that the mean was used as the descriptive statistic for 
analyzing and discussing data4. Percentage, mode or median would have 
described the data more correctly.” (Chiaro and Nocella 2004: 283) and, with 
regard to Kurz, our claim was that “percentage would have given a better 
comparison” (282). Admittedly, each turn of phrase could be seen as being 
rather heavy handed and inconsiderate. We could have perhaps been less direct 
and softened matters slightly by using words to the effect of: “Let us see what 
would have happened if the median/percentages had been used instead?” or 
possibly relegating the entire issue to a couple of footnotes. But would this have 
really changed anything if the analyses did not have a clear direction? More 
                                                          
4 For a detailed discussion on the concept of measurement see (Aaker et al. 1995: 56 
and Tull 1993: 309). 
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seriously however, Pöchhacker criticises the present authors for “their erroneous 
criticism of Bühler’s analysis”, well, for the sake of diplomacy, much as we 
have tried to fault our analysis, mathematics is not an opinion and we will show 
that it is not in the least “erroneous” (4.1).  
And if we were “rather harsh”, Pöchhacker’s critique is hardly tender. The 
use of subtle irony (or biting wit?) in the title of the essay5, or indeed in the 
heading of the section entitled “Into print?” is not exactly gentle either. A 
question mark can be every bit as cutting, if not more so, than a word. And here 
we are talking in terms of our academic credibility. Are we certain that the 
words spent on Kurz and Bühler deserve such a scathing attack? 
Our extensive, hands on experience in questionnaire based surveys 
(admittedly in other fields of research) led us both (foolhardily it would appear) 
to try our hand at applying our expertise to IS and also to feel (erroneously it 
now seems) that we had something to contribute to other less experienced 
researchers trying their hand at such surveys. Any impression of overconfidence 
surfacing from our study was quite unintentional, and by the same token, we 
wish to assert that, despite our experience, we are perfectly aware of how very 
little we do know and how much there is for us still to learn. However, we do 
feel that Pöchhacker is actually implying that as our study was less than perfect 
we should not have criticised others. And in a sense he is right. In an ideal world 
casting stones should be restricted to those without sin. Now we dared cast 
stones despite being less than immaculate ourselves. But the point is that our 
offences were venial rather than mortal and that most of the accusations for 
which we have been charged are fallacious. We sincerely believe that 
Pöchhacker’s critique is disproportionate and that the faults in our work are in 
no way connected with methodological mishandling and will demonstrate that, 
in contrast, other studies quoted by Pöchhacker contain major inadequacies. 
However, having said that, it would be a true pity if all the thought and 
energy which have gone into both Pöchhacker’s critical assessment of Chiaro 
and Nocella’s essay and this present retaliation were to degenerate into a 
lengthy scuffle of quid pro quo.6 Rather it would be desirable that both 
                                                          
5 The present authors would like to point out that ‘Revisiting and reanalyzing the 
work of Bühler and Kurz and replying to the work of Chiaro and Nocella on quality 
research’ would have been a more fitting title to the essay to which they are 
responding. Nevertheless, as a scholar of Humour Studies, Delia Chiaro cannot help 
but relish in the clever and, admittedly, successful inherent paronomasia coined by 
Pöchhacker for his title. 
6 In line with Pöchhacker’s anecdotal style it is also perhaps worth mentioning that 
ample correspondence via e-mail as well as a lengthy and affable telephone 
conversation between the two parties involved in this discussion had occurred prior 
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Pöchhacker’s critique and the present defence should serve to shed light upon 
what we still believe to be a shadowy area in IS, ie research design and 
implementation in QBQR and thus promote ample and, above all, constructive 
discussion.  
3. Beholding the splinters: interpreters on the Web 
Having been accused of several deficiencies, we now intend to tackle each and 
every one throughout the course of this comeback. Although these faults appear 
in a somewhat jumbled order in Pöchhacker’s critique, we have tried to 
disentangle them and present them, together with our rebuttal, in a logical order 
so as to facilitate both the reader and the force of our argument.  
3.1. Conceptual frameworks and operational definitions 
3.1.1. Key terms 
The liberal use of the word ‘perception’ is dangerous. Rather like cigarette 
smokers, consumers of the term should be made aware that its use may well 
present several hazards. In fact, Chiaro and Nocella dared to adopt the term 
liberally without defining it in operational terms and, as a result, have not only 
been accused of “imprecise use of key words” (this issue: 162) but, perhaps 
more significantly, also appear to have been severely misunderstood.  
In psychology and in the cognitive sciences the word ‘perception’ refers to 
the concept of acquiring, interpreting, selecting and organizing sensory 
information:  
The sense organs provide our brain with a steady flow of information 
about our environment and the brain’s task is then to take this raw 
material and use it to help us make sense of that environment through the 
process of perception. And the brain does its job so smoothly and well 
that we’re not even aware of what it does. (Statt 1997: 46) 
Now we have been, quite appropriately, criticized for our unclear use of the 
term in our study. And this is one criticism which we openly acknowledge. 
However, our use of the term ‘perception’ was quite deliberate. We were in no 
way confounding ‘perception’ with interpreters’ ‘generic expectations’ as 
suggested by Pöchhacker (this issue: 158), such confusion would indeed have 
“fallen short of the art” (Pöchhacker this issue: 158). Besides, why should we 
                                                                                                                                 
to going into print. It would not be unfair to say that communication concluded in a 
reciprocal decision to remain united in our diversity. 
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confuse perception with expectations? Is the study of expectations in IS 
compulsory? Why cannot perception be taken as a starting point instead? While 
aware of the fact that there is a strong tradition of investigations into 
expectations in IS (e.g. Kurz 1993, Moser 1996 etc.), expectations were not 
what Chiaro and Nocella were investigating at all, yet Pöchhacker seems to 
imply that wanting to look at interpreting from a different angle is not viable. Or 
rather that what we were really studying were expectations. Well, let us put the 
records straight and underscore that we were not seeking to access respondents’ 
awareness or judgment of performance. What we were trying to establish was 
interpreters’ consciousness of mental selections which they constantly make (our 
emphasis). To put it another way, we were plainly asking respondents to 
consider and attempt to untangle a complex mental process and express their 
awareness in terms of how they weighted a set of essential criteria against each 
other in their effort to transform incoming sensory information into verbal 
output in a different language. If this was erroneously confused with the 
expectations of a final product we trust that we have now clarified our position 
and again are obliged to the Editors of The Interpreters’ Newsletter for having 
given us the opportunity to make amends. Incidentally, is it not also the case 
that ‘expectations’ are more relevant when one is interviewing end-users, less so 
when the subjects are interpreters themselves? Surely, regardless of all, 
‘perception’ seems a more appropriate term to refer to self-monitoring by an 
interpreter? Over and above this, our essay contains a perceptual map (290) 
which displays interpreters’ mental image of the various criteria. Without 
wishing to be tautological, a perceptual map represents perception and not 
expectations. How can this have been construed as confusion on our behalf? 
Furthermore, we are also accused of not having distinguished between 
research on “generic expectations […] direct assessment, or judgement […]” 
(Pöchhacker this issue: 158). Needless to say, this omission was not because we 
didn’t know the difference or because we had deliberately decided to ignore the 
issue. Yet, operational definitions of these terms are nowhere to be found in any 
of the QBQR we have examined. Moser, for example, freely uses the term 
perception (1996: 148, 159) imprecisely when in effect what he was 
investigating were “judgements, needs and expectations” (145). We are 
criticised for using it. He gets away with it scot-free. Again, Mack and 
Cataruzza suddenly introduce the term with no further definition too (1995: 45) 
and more recently Garzone (2003: 23-24) also adopts it freely. Are we to be the 
first to be accused of a lack of operational definitions? Since Moser-Mercer 
introduced the concept of “optimum quality” (1996: 44), the issue of attempting 
to define the concept of quality itself any further appears to have slipped almost 
everyone’s mind until quite recently (Kurz 2001: 395 and 2003: 17-18). Again, 
the concept of multi-dimensional models of quality begin to be mentioned 
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(Garzone 2003: 23) while the only serious attempt at modeling the multifaceted 
issue of quality in interpreting has been produced by Gile (2003: 110). 
Now, let us turn to the term ‘experiment’, a word which, according to 
Pöchhacker, we have used improperly in reference to Kurz’s survey (Chiaro and 
Nocella 2004: 282). For the sake of argument, let us accept that we did use the 
term ‘experiment’ inappropriately. By the same token, Pöchhacker sets off our 
work against the controlled laboratory studies of Gourevich and Mateeff 
(1989)7; Collados Aís (1998, 2002); and Garzone (2003) in his defence of sound 
QBQR. Is this because he ignores the difference between an experiment and a 
survey? Or does Pöchhacker wish to widen the present dispute to colleagues 
adopting different methods by paying them homage? We repeat, we were/are 
only criticizing QBQR. Collados Aís and Garzone have carried out laboratory 
style research with which we have no bones to pick. And yes, we are aware of 
the difference between an experiment and a survey; the former is: 
A controlled situation in which the experimenter systematically changes 
the values of one or more variables [the independent variable(s)] to 
measure the impact of these changes on one or more other variables [the 
dependent variable(s)]. (Tull 1993: G-6) 
while the latter refers to the “systematic collection of information directly from 
respondents” (Tull 1993: 61). Furthermore,  
The important distinction between the survey and the experiment is that 
the survey takes the world as it comes, without trying to alter it, whereas 
the experiment systematically alters some aspects of the world in order to 
see what changes follow. (Simon 1969: 229) 
Or would Pöchhacker prefer us to adopt Vuorikoski’s vague definition of 
experimentation as something through which “… it is possible to arrive at clear 
causal inferences” (1993: 318)? 
Moreover, lexical networks are created within texts by the writer and false or 
close synonymy are simply textual strategies of reiteration (for ample discussion 
see Halliday and Hasan 1976: 278-279 and Hoey 1983). For the purpose of 
textual cohesion special synonymy with words which are not ‘normally’ 
synonymous are often created – if such a thing as ‘normal’ or absolute 
synonymy exists. Of course, this not only applies to our specific use of 
terminology but also to the other researchers who we have quoted above as a 
counter-argument (see Moser, Mack and Cattaruzza and Garzone’s use of the 
term ‘perception’ above). A similar argument can just as easily be constructed 
                                                          
7 We do not have access to this paper and are thus relying on Pöchhacker’s 
description of the study (Pöchhacker this issue: 160). 
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for the criticism of our use of the term “intonation” as a synonym of “fluency of 
delivery” (Pöchhacker this issue: 159 note 6). 
3.1.2. Conceptual frameworks 
Although Pöchhacker has understood that “Chiaro and Nocella base their review 
section on a two-fold distinction between product analysis and ‘field work 
(based upon the results of questionnaire surveys)’ (this issue: 158), a more 
accurate reading reveals that our distinction was, in effect, threefold and that we 
had we split QBQR into “analyses of the product” (Approach number 1), field 
work on end-users (Approach number 2) and field work on interpreters 
(Approach number 3) (280)8. Furthermore, we are also accused of not having 
considered Vuorikoski’s (1993) “fourfold distinction” created “specifically for 
the purpose of research on interpreting quality” (Pöchhacker this issue: 158). 
Pöchhacker is quite right, we do indeed ignore this “fourfold distinction”. 
However, the reason we have done so is simply because we were unable to 
locate this distinction. The only mention of anything remotely “fourfold” in 
Vuorikoski’s essay are the multi research methods she sets out to discuss. 
Therefore, the comparison Pöchhacker makes between our study and 
Vuorikoski’s is quite vain. Vuorikoski’s “fourfold distinction” regards the 
application of diverse research methods simultaneously. Our threefold 
distinction regards the ways in which quality research had been carried out so 
far in IS. In fact we state that  
…attempts at empirical research carried out so far on quality interpreting 
reflect these three perspectives [supplier of service, client and service 
itself] and have thus been based on a) analyses of product; b) field work 
based upon…end user perception and c) … interpreter perception…of 
interpretations in general. (Chiaro and Nocella 2004: 280).  
We know full well of the existence of multimodal research methods but to 
the best of our knowledge, no attempts have as yet been made to adopt them in 
QBQR.  
We are next charged with not providing sufficient rationale for choosing to 
examine interpreters rather than end-users. The pros and cons of one or the other 
have been argued at length in the field (Kurz 1993, Moser 1996 etc.) and we 
were (mistakenly it seems) convinced that we had argued our case adequately 
by explaining that interpreting is a service which is used by clients who 
presumably require assistance in understanding a language with which they are 
                                                          
8 Having argued about the meaning of perception (3.1.1.) it seems clear that 
Approaches 2 and 3 are diverse. 
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not familiar. This lack of knowledge of the source language renders end user 
quality judgement of the service of interpreting difficult as clients would be 
unable to judge a basic characteristic such as fidelity to the original (Chiaro and 
Nocella 2004: 281-282). Judging the quality of an interpretation is quite 
different from that of judging a regular marketable good. (We suggest that those 
convinced by our argument skip the rest of this section and move on to 3.2). A 
housewife asked to judge the quality of a pot of jam, for example, has a range of 
tangible and highly perceptible characteristics upon which to base her 
evaluation. The colour of the jam, how much it costs, it’s shelf life, nutritional 
information on the label, packaging and, last but not least, it’s flavour. In fact, 
we state that “Interpreting is a service and according to Economics a service is 
an intangible and non-transferable economic good and thus quite distinct from a 
physical commodity. Therefore the special nature of interpreting makes its 
evaluation difficult for people who consume the service but know very little 
about it” (281). Of course, a conference delegate can judge a variety of features 
connected to an interpreter’s voice quality, he or she can judge clarity and 
coherence of speech as well as their command of the language. But a genuine 
delegate is likely to be hard put to be able to judge the fidelity of an interpreted 
speech with the original. Thus our choice of respondents naturally fell on 
interpreters, and with two seminal studies to rely on, using Bühler as a 
springboard seemed a natural choice. 
3.2. The survey instrument 
3.2.1. Design 
Pöchhacker’s first incursion regarding our survey instrument concerns the fact 
that we did not discuss the reasons for not adopting Bühler’s criteria tout court. 
In fact, we adapted 7 criteria and we included a new one, namely “absence of 
stress” which twenty years ago may not have been an issue for Bühler’s 
interpreters. And here Pöchhacker has a point so we shall immediately make 
amends. The input of the experts who helped us construct our instrument 
together with our own common sense led us to accept that Bühler’s criteria 
“pleasant appearance” and “poise” could perhaps be cut as they possibly do not 
contribute to the quality of an interpretation. As for Bühler’s inclusion of 
“positive feedback from delegates”, this was considered to be a criterion which 
is not part of the interpreter’s self-perception and therefore jars with the truly 
linguistic and extra-linguistic criteria which we had decided to examine. Again 
the concept of “reliability” was excluded for similar reasons. Our sample of 
interpreters were asked verbatim to “rank (a list of) factors contributing to the 
quality of interpreting”. The concept of reliability was felt to be in a 
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hyperonymous relationship with the other factors. If an interpretation is of good 
quality it follows that it can be considered reliable precisely because it is made 
up of a positive relationship between the criteria listed. Finally, we changed 
Bühler’s “completeness of interpretation” to “completeness of information” and 
“thorough preparation of conference documents” to “preparation of conference 
documents” upon the advice of our informants. 
We also accept Pöchhacker’s criticism of our somewhat cavalier description 
of how we constructed our instrument basing it on “several interviews” and 
“endless brainstorming sessions” with interpreters (283). With neither of us 
being a practitioner we had to look outwards and seek professionals and 
academics for help in devising our instrument. Few of the well known studies in 
QBQR appear to have bothered with any preliminary research or if they did, 
they certainly do not mention it in their work. Moser (1996) is the only scholar 
to describe a preparatory phase of his survey but we are sure that there can be no 
disagreement that he is as offhand as we are in his description of this stage. 
Furthermore, we also acknowledge the fact that our questionnaire did not 
contain a request for information regarding respondents’ specialized fields of 
expertise. Neither was information solicited regarding working language 
combinations. But why regard the lack of such information as methodological 
deficiencies? The exclusion of queries to elicit such data were choices which we 
intentionally made and not slips of the mind.9 Firstly we had to keep the 
questionnaire as brief as possible as, in the days before the advent of widespread 
broadband connections, we did not know how much time people could spend on 
line, thus we opted for essentiality. More simply, interpreters may simply not 
want to waste their time filling out endless questions. Furthermore, the aim of 
the study was to provide a (reliable) springboard for further study. Thus, what 
we were searching for was broad-spectrum data. In other words, what we were 
interested in was obtaining a general idea of what the average conference 
interpreter perceived as being important and less important in his or her choices. 
In fact, our study was devised to be a starting point which might act as a spur for 
more particular, fine tuned studies. If, generally speaking, n conference 
interpreters reported that they perceive criteria x to be important when working 
to and from languages a, b, c or d, (to put it another way in and out from any 
                                                          
9 The exclusion of such data from our work was deliberate, however, let us imagine 
that we had simply skipped this variable for a number of reasons which could range 
from sloppiness and forgetfulness to sheer ignorance. Let us remind readers that the 
seminal works of Bühler and Kurz contain no socio-demographic variables at all, 
while one of Moser’s is based on guesswork (for a discussion see section 4.5.). 
Also, one might wonder where one should stop when it comes to assembling socio-
demographic information, surely you can always think up another variable that 
might be potentially relevant and that had not been taken into account! 
Looking quality research in the eye 179 
non-specified language), it would then be interesting to see how the same test 
stands to trial when applied to specific language combinations. As Pöchhacker 
suggests “interpreting styles may differ from one sociocultural context to 
another”(this issue: 158) – well let’s go out there and support this claim. Or else 
reject it. Who knows, perhaps interpreters’ perception of choices they make may 
even prove to be universal. After all, surely scientific experimentation starts 
from the general to the particular rather than vice-versa?  
As for challenging the language of the questionnaire’s administration, the 
use of English was again a conscious choice. Unlike other surveys in which we 
have been engaged where the issue of language was indeed a concern, here we 
were looking for all-encompassing generalized data. Furthermore, we are quite 
certain that we were not erring in an excessive credence in the linguistic 
colonialism of the English language by assuming that the hypothetical average 
interpreter would be likely to have a working knowledge of English. 
And in response to one of Pöchhacker’s most critical charges, to wit, the fact 
that the majority of our respondents claimed that they did not work into their 
native tongue, again, “baffling” as this may sound, this is how the sample 
responded and, like it or not, the information needs to be taken at face value. 
Should we have excluded these findings just because he is not happy about 
them? Or should we have manipulated our data and claimed the contrary? We 
would also like to take issue with Pöchhacker’s charge that the question which 
led us to the above claim was due to a “poorly worded questionnaire item” 
(Pöchhacker this issue: 159 note 7). In fact, Pöchhacker is basing this claim on 
an early draft of the instrument which we had sent him, and not to the final 
pluri-piloted version in which the wording had been improved and which we 
were unable to send him. However, if Pöchhacker is unhappy with our results 
and their subsequent interpretation, we suggest he rerun the test on a different 
sample. 
3.2.2. Distribution 
Next, we are accused of having given “an all too sparse description of their 
sampling procedure” (this issue: 159). Way back in 2000 when we conducted 
the survey, Web based questionnaires were indeed a novelty and today, the way 
we sampled at the time makes us both smile at our naïve techniques. What we 
did, which would be highly irregular today (as well as being almost impossible 
with the number of fire-walls and anti-spamming programs which have been 
widely installed in computers), was to spam an invitation to visit the site 
containing our questionnaire to a number of mailing lists of conference 
interpreters world wide. These lists were collected by networking and included a 
list of EU interpreters, and national associations across the world. At this point 
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Pöchhacker could easily argue that our sample is unreliable because it was 
restricted to Internet users and that we only invited about 1000 interpreters to 
participate. True, there surely are more than a 1000 interpreters in the world and 
of course we are aware that we did not contact every single one of them. But the 
point is that we were sampling and not contacting the entire population of 
interpreters. We are well aware that the 1000 interpreters we contacted had not 
been selected according to the table of random numbers. In other words, we 
cannot be sure that every interpreter with an e-mail address received our 
invitation to participate and that others did not receive the information twice. 
Nevertheless, we would like to call attention to our good faith by highlighting 
that neither of us are practitioners and between the pair of us we only knew 
about a score of interpreters at the time. This means that we were unable to use 
personal networking to create our sample, so at least Pöchhacker should give us 
our due and allow us to go down in IS history as being the first QBQR 
researchers who did not depend on a self selected, albeit a convenient, sample.  
3.3. The mathematics behind the scores 
One comment of Pöchhacker’s which the authors (partially) agree with is the 
lack of accessibility of the statistical analysis. Or rather, for an IS readership the 
statistics may well be inaccessible whereas in fields such as psychology, 
economics and marketing research there would no need to explain the 
mathematics behind well-known techniques unless data is being modelled 
introducing innovative elements. The “sum of the scores”10 (Chiaro and Nocella 
2004: 288) is a descriptive statistic, so if there is a need to explain it we should 
clarify every descriptive statistic from mean to mode and from standard 
deviation to range and so on. 
Finally, Pöchhacker introduces “A finer point, which deserves comment 
only in the context of aspirations to maximum methodological rigor” and criti-
cizes our “use of unequal scales for the visualization of comparable percentages, 
as in the autors’ Figure 2 (Chiaro and Nocella 2004: 287)” (this issue: 163) We 
really do not understand this comment. How can the scales be unequal if all the 
data summarized in Figure 2, labelled “Distribution of the degree of importance 
given to each linguistic criterion”,11 was obtained from the same rank scale. 
Instead of presenting our data in one crowded graph which may have been 
confusing, we simply split the data into three different line graphs to allow 
                                                          
10 The sum or total of the values, across all the cases with non-missing values. 
11 A typo which Pöchhacker did not spot is the plural form CRITERIA which appears 
instead of singular CRITERION above figure 2. 
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readers to follow the distribution of the 9 criteria under investigation more 
easily. 
4. Ignoring the beams 
What follows is a brief overview of the QBQR quoted by Pöchhacker in this 
issue. We wish, however, to begin by reiterating that most of the contributions 
Pöchhacker mentions and sets off against our own work present a series of gross 
methodological deficiencies. Secondly, we would like to declare that we are 
somewhat uncomfortable with having to draw attention to these studies, but 
having had our own work publicly scrutinized for what are patently much lesser 
faults, we cannot but support our claims that “research undertaken so far is 
surprisingly lacking in methodological rigour” (Chiaro and Nocella 2004: 278) 
by pointing to these examples. In fact, if we had originally spoken of “uncertain 
methodological principles” (279), a sense of delicacy had led us to go no further 
and remain somewhat vague. Now, while we are aware that our lack of humility 
in criticizing others has led to the disparagement of our own work, what still 
remains a mystery is why Pöchhacker should consider the splinters in our eyes 
and yet demonstrably overlook the beams in those of others. Thus the necessity 
to safeguard our own faces internationally now leads us to bring these beams to 
light. This will be done following a chronological order and restricting the 
review to the field of surveys pertaining to quality alone. 
Interestingly, most of the surveys which Pöchhacker plays off against Chiaro 
and Nocella’s Web survey reveal a strikingly similar series of faults which 
principally regard three areas, namely the sampling frames, the measurement 
scales adopted and the choice of statistical test. We will briefly tackle all three 
with reference not only to the work of Bühler and Kurz, but also to that of 
Vuorikoski, Mack and Cataruzza, Moser and finally Pöchhacker. 
4.1. Bühler 
Pöchhacker appears to be puzzled by the fact that the present authors did not 
take issue with regard to the rather small sample of 41 interpreters who returned 
questionnaires in Bühler’s well-known study. We really see no cause for 
bewilderment simply because this study as most of the others regarding QBQR 
is simply descriptive in nature i.e. there is no use of any technique of inferential 
statistics. As a result, in absence of any use of probability theory, there is no 
need to argue about sample size12, Bühler was not inferring from the sample to 
                                                          
12 Most text books on general statistics and methods in social research tackle the issue 
of sample size (i.e. budget constraint, sampling error, interval estimation, etc.). 
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the population but simply commenting percentages on the criteria investigated. 
On the other hand, what Pöchhacker should really be asking is why Bühler 
decided to use a sample size of 41 as this cannot be deduced from her article. 
Why indeed 41? Budget constraints? Time constraints? Rule of thumb? Or was 
sample size determined according to statistical theory considering factors such 
as reliability, confidence, tolerable error and precision?  
However, what we would like to highlight once more in Bühler’s explorative 
work, the importance of which is still relevant in IS today, regards the way in 
which these criteria were assessed. In order to test the importance of these 
criteria Bühler adopted the following measurement scale: 
Highly important, Important, Less important, Irrelevant 
The fact that most of her respondents only chose the two highest points of 
the scale: “highly important” and “important” was what led us to question the 
validity of the instrument. This is also confirmed in Pöchhacker’s graphic effort 
(bar chart this issue: 145, 148) to reanalyse Bühler’s data. Instead of showing 
what he claims to be a “clear cut differentiation” (this issue: 145) it shows a 
clearly skewed sampling distribution with a tail on the right for almost all the 
criteria investigated. So in the light of this observation we asked ourselves, was 
the measurement scale adopted the most appropriate? Had the questionnaire 
been properly piloted? Furthermore, why use a scale which is unbalanced 
towards the importance of linguistic and extra-linguistic criteria with no mid-
point of neutrality and no escape route for those who did not know what to 
answer?13 How can we verify whether most of these items are really so 
important or highly important to interpreters?  
In other words, we asked ourselves whether interpreters should evaluate 
each item independently or whether they should play off the items against each 
other. Therefore, the question of how to measure the importance of these criteria 
led us to consider sets of non-comparative scales (e.g. continuous rating scales, 
itemized rating scales such as Likert scales, semantic differential scales and 
staple scales) and comparative scales (e.g. paired comparisons, graded paired 
comparisons, constant sum scales and rank order scales) in order to decide 
whether to modify the scale used or to choose a new measurement scale.14 With 
the intention of testing whether interpreters could discriminate in terms of 
importance, a rank order scale seemed to be the most appropriate because 
interpreters could compare these criteria in one fell swoop according to their 
                                                          
13 An example of such a scale could be: ‘Highly important’, ‘Important’, ‘Neither 
important nor unimportant’, ‘Unimportant’, ‘Irrelevant’, ‘I don’t know’. 
14 For a detailed discussion on measurement scales see Aaker et al. (1995), 
Maholtra (1996), Tull and Hawkins (1993). 
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level of importance. What is more, as the cognitive exertion involved in 
choosing from 16 factors would have been extremely high, we split the criteria 
under investigation into two separate sets: linguistic criteria and extra-linguistic 
criteria. Hopefully, this should have somewhat eased respondents’ efforts at 
selection. If there are any shortcomings in the chosen scale, they could be linked 
to the fact that the process of selection was controlled by an algorithm in Java 
script which did not allow interpreters to give the same level of importance to 
two or more factors. However, having noted in the initial piloting stages of the 
project that nobody took issue with this characteristic it remained unchanged 
throughout. At the end of the sampling a total of three interpreters complained 
about this restriction in choice.  
For the sake of argument regarding our criticism of the mathematics 
employed by Bühler and challenged by Pöchhacker, we must remind readers the 
objects were measured on an ordinal scale which was also unbalanced, thus 
Because we don’t know the amount of difference between objects, the 
permissible arithmetic operations are limited to statistics such as the 
median or mode (but not the mean). Our emphasis. (Aaker et al. 1995: 
257) 
Finally, we note in passing that, Bühler’s survey contains no information 
about the socio-economic characteristics and professional experience of the 
interpreters who took part in the survey.  
4.2. Kurz 
In order to defend the work of Kurz, Pöchhacker compares her sample with 
Moser’s (1996) arguing in favour of the greater validity of the former sample of 
124 end users which had been collected at only three conferences while Moser 
had to gather data at 84 different conferences in different parts of the world in 
order to collect a final sample of 201 end users. Clearly, being based on 84 
extremely diverse conferences, Moser’s sample could15 surely have been more 
representative than Kurz’s sample. But this is not the point. Let us examine the 
precise date in which data was gathered at Kurz’s conference on general 
medicine. According to the original publication of this study, Kurz gathered her 
data in 1988 (Kurz 1993) while according to the reprinted version it was 
apparently collected in 1989 (Pöchhacker 2001). After the ruthless critique of 
the editorial process of the journal Meta with regard to Chiaro and Nocella, how 
could such a significant detail have escaped Pöchhacker’s notice? Are we to 
                                                          
15 We are adopting a tentative conditional form because when we discuss the 
study by Moser we will illustrate why his sample is equally unrepresentative. 
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assume that the date was erroneous in the 1993 article? If so, why did not 
Pöchhacker add a footnote to clarify the point? Was 1989 the correct date of the 
study or was it a typo? Or is this to remain a mystery? However, as we referred 
to Kurz’s original study (1993) we wondered how much time had lapsed 
between her three data sets. It is worth remembering that Kurz compares the 
data gathered from Bühler’s 47 interpreters in 1986 with data from her own 
three samples collected between 1988 and 1989. Could it be that there were 
almost two years between Kurz’s three sub-samples and almost four years 
between Bühler’s study and the Council of Europe meeting? Now the point is 
whether sample size is so important with such a large time gap in sequential 
sampling? Sequential sampling is a technique adopted when taking decisions 
(usually in business and marketing) which depend upon laws of probability. If 
sampling had been deliberately sequential in nature we would need to know 
whether Bühler’s interpreters and Kurz’s end users inhabited an immutable 
world or a dynamic one. Surely four years must have brought a minimum of 
technological and scientific progress to the world of interpreting. Now if 
progress has zero impact on the world then a comparison between samples 
collected at different points in time may be plausible. However, as occurs in 
most human activity, technological and scientific progress travel at breakneck 
speed, thus a comparison is almost bound to present problems. Why? Progress 
(better working conditions in booths, use of PCs, more sophisticated technology, 
more competent interpreters, more fastidious end users etc.) could, on the one 
hand, have an impact on the average performance of interpreters and, on the 
other, on end users’ power of assessment and thus the comparison of 
expectations of the different groups will be problematic, unless, of course, this is 
accounted for methodologically.  
As for testing, Kurz appears to have adopted Bühler’s measuring scales even 
though this is not clearly mentioned apart from a vague reference to evaluating 
“[…] the quality of interpretation on a four point scale” (15). It is clear that the 
issues we raised regarding Bühler’s measurement scales apply here too. 
Furthermore, Kurz claims that she wishes to test the hypothesis that “different 
groups of end users have different expectations and needs” (15) and yet presents 
a set of descriptive data which remain untested. Furthermore, the same 
information in Table 1 (16) is repeated in Figs. 1, 2 and 3 (17) in the form of bar 
charts. Therefore, are we, like Pöchhacker to assume that peers were not 
consulted and/or that refereeing was slack?  
Finally, Kurz does not attempt to compare the different groups (124 users 
and 47 interpreters). Instead of grouping her end users together as a single set 
and comparing them to the 47 professionals, she seems to lose her thread and 
goes on only to compare the three sub-sets to each other. Furthermore, the 
CACL group (6 experts) from Bühler’s study are merged into the 47 interpreters 
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yet remain unmentioned. Again there is no mention of socio-demographic 
characteristics of her samples. Would this not have influenced opinions? 
4.3. Vuorikoski 
Vuorikoski makes an attempt to import multi-method research to quality 
research in IS. Unfortunately, her efforts at innovation fall short as she brings 
neither methodological innovation nor any empirical contribution to the field. 
Although she mentions a variety of methods available, her own survey does not 
reflect the spirit of multi-method research which she so strongly advocates. In 
fact, it is quite unclear where exactly the “eclectic” (1993: 318) dimension in 
her study is. The author, in fact, claims that  
… the small size of typical fieldwork research was compensated for with 
survey techniques. By covering five different seminars, each having 
about 100 participants, there would be more ground for generalizing the 
results. The size of the seminars was closer to that of fieldwork, and 
consequently no statistical sampling method was necessary: the seminars 
were considered to be theoretically relevant populations as such, and 
large enough for statistical analysis when treated as one population. 
(Vuorikoski 1993: 318) 
This is, of course, a clearly contradictory statement regarding sample size. Is 
Vuorikoski saying that both samples are large, or is she saying that they both are 
small, or is one large and the other small? It would appear that the author swings 
back and forth from population to sample making sweeping statements yet with 
no mention of theory when she should have quoted some law of probability 
theory in support of her argument. 
As for the survey itself, Vuorikoski declares that respondents were asked to 
give a phone number so as to allow for follow up phone interviews. Here too we 
find a contradiction as the author claims that “Telephone interviewing was 
selected as an alternative to the more traditional face-to-face interview” (323). 
Now rather than an alternative which allows the comparison of two independent 
samples and would have thus given force to a multi-method approach, what we 
appear to have here is a paired sub-sample of the same respondents being 
interviewed before and after the conference. In terms of number of people 
interviewed telephonically and what they were asked, these elements remain 
unknown. Hardly multi-method. Finally, Vuorikoski entitles a chapter “The 
eleven statements in the questionnaire” (321). Overlooking the fact that some of 
these “statements” turn out to actually be “questions”, in questionnaires 
statements are usually measured on 5 or 7 point Likert scales. And here 
Vuorikoski is finally innovative as she adopts a two point scale which includes 
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the two options “agree” and “disagree” with no mid-point. However, to do her 
justice, she did include an “I don’t know” escape route. 
Over and above all these problems, the study is purely descriptive, research 
hypotheses are vague and no attempt is made to test them or even to really argue 
in favour of the much quoted multi-research methods she so fervently upholds. 
In the light of this discussion, is Pöchhacker still certain that we should have 
quoted this study? And again, we are forced to ask ourselves, were the referees 
caught out sleeping on the job just for us? 
4.4. Mack and Cattaruzza 
With regard to the descriptive survey carried out by Mack and Cattaruzza 
(1995) we do not wish to discuss sampling, measurement scales and statistical 
tests as we have with the others. The reason for this is to be found in the 
conclusions of their work in which they claim that  
Since this survey was conducted and elaborated using non-professional 
statistical means, no attempt was made to generalize its results nor 
achieve full comparability with previous studies, as this would require 
more sophisticated methods (47). 
The awareness and unassuming nature of the two researchers admission of 
their lack in methodological know how makes criticism of their shortcomings 
absolutely unnecessary. Surprisingly too, of all the studies in QBQR, it is the 
study with fewest methodological weaknesses.  
4.5. Moser 
Once more, taking Pöchhacker’s comments as a starting point, we would like to 
specify that rather than defend the size of Kurz’s sample in terms of having “by 
no means” being dwarfed by that of Moser (this issue: 146), we should instead 
ask ourselves how the giant (i.e. Moser’s sample 1996) was produced. In fact, 
even if Moser’s sample size is considerable, an impressive 201 respondents was 
pretty remarkable for the field of interpreting at that time, the way in which 
participants were interviewed at 84 different meetings clearly shows that the 
sample was self selected. How do we know this? First and foremost because an 
average of 2.4 interviews took place at each conference and of these 1.2 
involved speakers as opposed to delegates. Surely speakers and end users cannot 
be considered as the same thing unless speakers are considered a particular 
Looking quality research in the eye 187 
segment of end users?16 Furthermore, out of scores of participants how were the 
respondents who were not speakers actually selected? Did each of the 
participants have an equal chance of being chosen? What we are saying is that 
sampling is not simply a question of size but, also importantly about how a 
sample is selected.  
Furthermore, also in the case of Moser, the nature of the study is just 
descriptive and explorative. In fact, there is no application of any statistical test 
even if in this case the author in the central concerns of the survey states that he 
wants to investigate the “hypothesis … that different user groups would have 
different expectations of interpretation” (1996: 146). Yet how this hypothesis is 
going to be tested and the relative results are left to the imagination of the 
readers; similarly where the author sees the “positive correlation” (157) between 
increasing conference-going experience and the fact that users want the 
interpretation to match the original also remains statistically unexplained. 
Naturally, considering the self selected sample one could argue about the 
parameters of distribution involved in the statistical test chosen, but since this 
was not the case we can only leave the answer to the reader’s imagination.  
Now, in order to understand the way in which Moser measured his items we 
have been forced to draw on both the work published by AIIC (1995) and a 
different version of the same study published in Interpreting (1996). We have 
had to look at both articles because interestingly, the same study published in 
the journal omits a great deal of background information present in the initial 
study. Measurement scales, for example, are not stated in the 1996 article. So, 
let us pick on a couple of examples to examine how Moser in his survey 
measured some items relating to end users’ needs and expectations. regarding 
“completeness of rendition”, “clarity of expression” and “correct terminology” 
for which the following scale was used: 
 
Very Fairly Fairly Unimportant Ambiguous I don’t 
important Important unimportant   know 
 
Firstly, we can see that the scale seems to be lacking in a central point (ie 
“neither important nor unimportant”), unless of course the reader is supposed to 
assume that the item “ambiguous” is filling the gap. Now, if our first assumption 
is true, that is that the scale is lacking in a central point, then it follows that the 
scale is incomplete. If, on the other hand, “ambiguous” is a deliberate choice in 
the scale for the central point, then there is obviously a problem of wording in 
communicating the points of the scale. Wording, as pointed out previously 
(see 2), is a very important aspect of setting up measurement scales. Moreover, 
                                                          
16 Of course we are well aware that at some conferences speakers are there also as 
delegates. 
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Moser only comments on criteria which respondents judged as being “very 
important” (162 and 163) according to conference type. In other words, he is 
giving readers a somewhat incomplete picture of user expectation by concealing 
other information.  
Now let us take another example from the AIIC publication (1995: C1, C2). 
After having asked respondents to indicate the importance of three criteria 
(“completeness of rendition”, “clarity of expression” and “correct terminology”) 
according to the scale mentioned above, they were then asked, under the label 
“other”, to identify criteria not specified in the preceding questions.17 Now the 
issue of the word “other” followed by a list begs the following question: why 
after such extensive preliminary research were none of these criteria identified 
and inserted in the questionnaire to be measured on the same scale reported 
above? Could it be that the observer’s paradox has reared its head? In other 
words, what we are trying to say is that if the target population were end users it 
should have clearly been tested on a group of end users before final 
administration. This is not clear from the final version of the questionnaire in 
German neither in terms of numbers, nor in terms of the people interviewed 
(interpreters again or end users?). However, over and above this, the list of 
assorted criteria detected by informants leads the reader, in any case, up a blind 
alley as their degree of importance is not measured with the same scale as the 
first three criteria. In other words, these criteria are incomparable with the first 
three. An example of a more gross error is finding the item “correct 
terminology” under “other” when the respondent had already given an opinion 
on that criterion in the previous question. 
For the sake of argument, let us consider one more example of a scale 
adopted in the same study (1995: C4, C5): 
 
Very Fairly Not really Unimportant Don’t know Ambiguous 
irritating irritating irritating    
 
In this case the researcher is trying to measure end users’ degree of irritation 
of particular behaviour of interpreters. The question which arises here is why 
include “importance” in a scale which is trying to measure irritation? And again 
we find the baffling item “ambiguous” occurring once more. Last but not least, 
we have yet another unbalanced scale, with no central point. How come?  
                                                          
17 The choice of criteria listed by Moser under a stark “Other” are “synchronicity, 
emotional congruence, pleasant voice, correct terminology, focus on essentials, 
technical knowledge, faithfulness to the original, faithfulness to the meaning of the 
original (sic.), clarity of expression, neutrality towards the speaker, lively, animated 
delivery, translation of jokes and asides, native sounding accent, stop when a 
mistake is made, other.” (1995: C2) 
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So how did the editorial process work here?18 Do high standards of 
refereeing apply only to the work and Chiaro and Nocella published in Meta or 
are these criteria universal? We will however return to this issue in a dedicated 
paragraph (5). 
Curiously, at a certain point Moser’s study introduces the concept of 
attitudes towards providers of the service in order “to shed additional light on 
the study” (p. 159) and sets out to ask end users what they consider to be 
particularly interesting and particularly difficult about the interpreting 
profession.19 Well, how attitudes are used in this context is not clear despite the 
fact that already at the time in which this survey was conducted attitude models 
such as the Fishbein model (theory of reasoned action) and the Ajzen model 
(theory of planned behaviour) to try to measure attitudes were already well 
established (Ajzen 1991; Solomon 2004). However, the important conclusion at 
which Moser arrives using the term attitude (in the broadest possible sense?) is 
that it is linked to “the broad educational and cultural background for which 
they (interpreters) are envied” (160). 
Finally, also in this survey, information about respondents’ education and 
professions which could have played an important role in testing the unproven 
hypothesis were not solicited. And unusually, instead of directly asking 
respondents (end users?) how old they were, ages were supplied by interviewers 
(interpreters) who “were asked to estimate the age of persons interviewed” 
(1996: 151) thus bringing to mind vets who estimate the age of horses by 
examining their teeth. Why were interviewers not asked to guess other socio-
demographic data too? Presumably because apart from evaluating a person’s 
sex, the rest is quite difficult. Again, it would appear that Meta is not the only 
journal to suffer from lax refereeing. 
4.6. Pöchhacker 
According to Mark Twain there are three kinds of lies: “lies, damned lies and 
statistics.” And it is undeniably a truism that statisticians can manoeuvre 
numbers at their will. And this is precisely what Pöchhacker attempts to do by 
offering readers fresh analyses of his colleagues’ data. 
                                                          
18 We have chosen just a couple of the numerous faults in Moser’s work simply for 
the sake of argument. 
19 Moser’s question “What do you find particularly interesting about the 
profession, and what particularly difficult?” (1996: 159) is actually two 
questions in one and thus would require rewording. 
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4.6.1. Kurz’s calculations according to Pöchhacker 
Pöchhacker occupies more or less a third of his essay re-elaborating the data of 
Ingrid Kurz. His re-elaboration of the percentages in Bühler and Kurz’s and 
comments on figures 2a, 2b, 3a e 3b have already been amply discussed in 
paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2 above. However, before we offer our own interpretation 
of this recent amplification of the data, we wish to make a short premise. 
Without a shadow of a doubt the energy which Pöchhacker has exerted into the 
re-elaboration of his colleagues’ data is, to say the least, admirable. 
Nevertheless, his efforts recall the period between the two World Wars when the 
first social scientists were lacking in a compass (a research hypothesis) to guide 
them through their studies. In fact, they would start off by gathering data willy-
nilly and subsequently observing what emerged. The only guide they had at the 
time was their personal capacity to elaborate data with the means of sound 
techniques (Guidicini 1996). In other words, our predecessors possessed neither 
computers nor sophisticated, click-of-the-mouse software. Fortunately, their 
somewhat careless manner of conducting research was soon to be replaced by 
one which started off by forming a hypothesis, gathering and elaborating 
specific data and subsequently either confirming or rejecting the initial 
assumptions aided with new technology which was to come to their rescue. 
In his discussion of the use of statistical tests on Kurz’s data Pöchhacker 
seems to have lost his compass as he appears to oscillate between testing group 
differences on continuous variables, testing relationships among discrete 
variables and testing both together. Does he see the nature of the variable? Can 
the same variable be both discrete and continuous at the same time?20 
Pöchhacker is analyzing categorical data from an unbalanced ordinal scale.21 
First he applies chi squared testing to check whether there are any relationships 
between two or more categorical variables and then on the same data he 
explores differences amongst the groups treating the variables as though they 
were continuous. 
Moreover, during the application of the chi squared test, Pöchhacker quite 
rightly observes that more cells have the expected frequency which is smaller 
than five and begins by admitting that “ the expected frequency in the chi-square 
test is smaller than five, which renders any interpretation of the test invalid” 
(this issue) and that the sample is not big enough, and then that the data should 
have had a more balanced distribution. But, in order to resolve the problem he 
collapses the 2 categories of the scale adopted by Bühler and Kurz (i.e. “less 
                                                          
20 Obviously it is possible to transform a continuous variable into a discrete one but 
the reverse would be more complex. 
21 For a detailed discussion on statistical tests on categorical data see Agresti 
2002. 
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important” and “irrelevant”) into a single category labelled “not important”. Is it 
really plausible to collapse “irrelevant” and “less important” into a single cat-
egory? In other words, surely “very important”, “important” and “less import-
ant” have more in common semantically with each other than “less important” 
and “irrelevant”? Would it not have been more reasonable to collapse all the 
categories which measured importance so that the new dichotomic variable 
would have been acceptable? Pöchhacker would then at least have had all the 
dominions of “importance” in one category and “irrelevance” in the other. One 
last point, Pöchhacker includes an explanation of an elementary concept such as 
cross tabulation yet does not elucidate chi square distribution, the significance 
of probability p or acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis. Surely if 
anything needed clarification it would be the latter concepts and not the former. 
At the beginning of the sub paragraph “Other non parametric tests (this 
issue?)” Pöchhacker states that “Aside from the chi-square test, there are other 
nonparametric tests for identifying significant relationships among different sets 
of rank-ordered data” and he uses the Kruskal-Wallis H and the Mann-Witney U 
tests. Here again, it is unclear whether he is looking for relationships or 
differences. And in applying these tests, if respondents had originally been 
asked to express their opinion on a single unbalanced item scale for the various 
criteria, how did he obtain his rank ordered data? Is he still using mean scores? 
If so, once more is the variable continuous or discrete? Moreover he does not 
explain that the use of asymptotic significance for the exact test may not be a 
good measure of significance if the variables are poorly distributed, which 
seems the case with these data sets. It would appear that Pöchhacker is simply 
looking for anything significant in the dataset without clarifying how he is 
manipulating his data. Moreover to explain differences among the 3 groups on 
the criteria which resulted as being significant, he runs the Mann Witney U test 
taking into consideration the three combinations of the three independent 
samples. Well, in this case we would like to point out that by following this path 
Pöchhacker is falling into the so called “familywise” or “experimentwise” error 
rate (Field 2000)22. In other words, is he aware that the probability of making at 
least one type I error is increasing from 0.05 to 0.143? If the Bühler group was 
included, and we do not understand why in his re-analysis this group has been 
omitted, this probability would have jumped to 0.185. 
But why, we wonder, twenty years on does Pöchhacker want to show 
significance at all costs? Undeniably, more than one statistical test can be 
                                                          
22 We apologize but space does not allow us to explain testing hypotheses. 
However, the topic is treated in almost all text books on general statistics. As 
regards the figure assuming the independence of the samples we apply the 
independent law of probability: in the case of 3 groups (0.95)3 ≈ 0.857 and  
(1-0.857) ≈ 0.143. 
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carried out on both Bühler and Kurz’s data, on our data, or on anyone else’s data 
come to that, but is there any point? If a researcher originally sets out to either 
accept or reject a particular hypothesis, why demonstrate that they could have 
done something different? 
Our discussion of the beams seems to have highlighted the difficulty both of 
choosing and applying a statistical test in the studies examined so far. We would 
now like to dedicate a few words to this issue as succinctly as possible for 
obvious reasons of space. 
4.6.2. The choice of a statistical test: an overview 
In the light of our previous discussion, it now seems evident that the choice of a 
statistical test cannot be dictated simply by the significance or lack of 
significance deducted from p values produced by any “PC-based statistics 
software […] accessible enough to be used, with proper guidance, also by the 
‘semi-skilled’ analyst” (Pöchhacker this issue: 154). On the contrary, the choice 
of a statistical test should be made in function of three general conditions at the 
same time: the research question, the nature of the data and the plan or design of 
the research. 
The research question should veer in a clear direction. From the start, the 
researcher should know whether the aim is to find differences or correlations 
between or among the variables which are object of the study. Once the 
researcher has decided which direction the study will take, inferential statistics 
offer numerous tests which test the hypothesis underlying the research question: 
univariate, bivariate and multivariate techniques23. Naturally, the choice of a test 
also depends upon the nature of the data. Does the data consist of discrete or 
continuous variables? And what are the forces of the measurement scales upon 
which the variables were measured: nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio-scaled? 
As a result, descriptive statistics and statistical tests must be also gauged in 
function of the metric or non metric nature of the variable and of the force of the 
measurement scale. The research design used to generate the data also affects 
the choice of a statistical test. So, decisions regarding the independence of the 
samples, number of groups, number of variables and variable control must be 
taken a priori. Moreover, when a technique is used, the assumptions regarding 
that technique have to be satisfied before applying the technique. So if one 
wishes to apply ANOVA for example, to explore differences among groups, the 
assumptions of independent random samples, normality and equal variances of 
                                                          
23 There is really no room to explain even briefly the statistical techniques included in 
these three groups, however explanations can be found in basic and more higher 
level text books in general and advanced statistics. 
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all populations must be assessed. So, the analyst should explore the dataset in 
order to understand whether these conditions have been satisfied. But if the 
necessary assumptions are violated what should be done? Well, it depends on 
which assumptions have been violated. If normality or equal variances are 
involved then transformation to symmetry24 could be applied (Ryan 1985) to 
approach a Gaussian distribution25. However, if one or more samples differ in a 
significant way from the population of interest then it could be very difficult to 
draw any conclusions from the dataset. An explorative analysis becomes more 
stringent and of paramount importance when more variables are involved, i.e. 
when multivariate techniques are used (Hair et al. 1995). In this case, the 
relationship among variables, the analysis of missing data, the detection of 
outliers through graphical output (e.g. stem and leaf diagrams or box plots) or 
statistics (e.g. Mahalanobis D2) and the verifications of the assumptions such as 
normality, homoscedasticity26 and linearity are something which cannot be 
solved just by a few clicks of a mouse. 
Finally, while we are perfectly aware that the advent of user-friendly 
statistical software has facilitated the application of statistical tests and the 
mathematical calculations behind them, we firmly believe that these very 
packages require a sound knowledge of the field of statistics. We cannot 
possibly agree that  
[…] analyzing empirical data […] is not a question of mathematical skills 
but, essentially, a matter of meaningful interpretation, of making sense of 
the relationships indicated by the data (Pöchhacker this issue: 155). 
This does not do the field of research methodology justice. Without 
understanding what he or she is doing in terms of statistics, the researcher not 
only runs the risk of misapplication of tests but also of a poor interpretation of 
results. Not only, but whether a statistical significance test “does not explain 
anything but merely points reliably to what needs to be explained” (Pöchhacker 
this issue: 155) is highly debatable too. 
                                                          
24 Of all transformations made on data in practice, the three most popular are the 
square root (moderate), the logarithm (strong) and negative reciprocal (very strong). 
25 When assumptions are violated one could also think of applying non parametric 
tests which are less stringent in matching assumptions; in the case of ANOVA one 
could use the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
26 Homoscedasticity is an assumption related primarily to dependence relationships 
between variables. It refers to the assumption that dependent variable(s) exhibit 
equal levels of variance and homogeneity of variance across the range of predictor 
variable(s). (Hair et al. 1995: 67). 
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5. To print or not to print  
It is clear from his use of ironic punctuation (“Into print”: 161) that Pöchhacker 
did not consider our study worthy of publication. For reasons of delicacy we 
would rather avoid the hearsay and the chitchat surrounding our article’s 
journey from Italy to Canada.  
Moreover, in defence of Meta and the referees of our article, we wish once 
more to take total responsibility of all shortcomings which are totally our own 
and not imputable to the journal27. From our point of view, our article was sent 
to Canada in mid-2001, refereed about six months later, corrected, accepted and 
finally published in the summer of 2004. However, perhaps it would have been 
more correct if Pöchhacker’s article had appeared in Meta rather than The 
Interpreters’ Newsletter seeing that it is the former journal which is under 
attack. Unfortunately, when Pöchhacker thoughtfully sent us his paper, he had 
already sent it to The Newsletter thus we too had no option but to respond in the 
same journal. But thinking more precisely on the matter, perhaps a Special Issue 
on quality is exactly where this discussion should take place. However  
Aristotle argues that there are three kinds of rhetorical proof; that is three 
ways in which a speaker can persuade an audience of his position – ethos, 
pathos and logos. Ethos is ethical proof, the convincing character of the 
speaker (…) Pathos is an appeal to the emotions of the audience (…) 
Logos is logical proof, or argument, the kind of proof that appeals to 
reason (Root 1987: 16-18). 
And we have attempted to defend ourselves from Pöchhacker’s accusations 
taking the philosopher’s advice by blatantly appealing above all to the reader’s 
understanding of our competence in research methodology, as well as to his or 
her emotions and reason. We hope to have clarified above all our use of the term 
perception (3.1.1.); that our sampling frame was accurate (3.2.2.) and 
demonstrated that our criticism of Bühler was all but erroneous (4.1.). In doing 
so, we have been forced, albeit unwillingly, to be harsh on others.  
However, what emerges from the present discussion is that over the years, 
macroscopic faults in the refereeing process in this field have been common 
across the board. Admittedly our argument was perhaps circular. This is one 
criticism which Pöchhacker makes that we feel we must accept, but we still 
wish to claim that our study was methodologically sound in design, 
                                                          
27 Above all, we humbly apologize for our misspelling of Kopczyński, for depriving 
Susan Bassnet’s surname of an ‘s’ and the “infelicities in the bibliography.” 
However, IS must be in an embarrassingly poor state if, in an attempt to punish two 
authors who have (apparently) stepped out of line, Pöchhacker feels he must 
include typos in a critique of methodology. 
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administration and data elaboration. Indeed, we could have extended our article 
with more detailed information, rationale and discussion. But could not the same 
be said of the other works mentioned? The methodological faults we have found 
in others are substantial and incomparable to the display of nitpicking displayed 
by our plaintiff. Circular? Maybe. But what have been the conclusions that other 
researchers adopting QBQR have reached so far? Have they been so insightful? 
But again, whatever their findings and conclusions at least they had a go, unlike 
our complainant who simply sits and looks and then comments from high with a 
critical eye. Indeed, one wonders whether such an eye is really critical. For us 
the word misguided seems more fitting. What is more, as two researchers 
looking in from the periphery, the argumentation put forward by Pöchhacker 
makes the field of QBQR in IS appear somewhat self referential to say the least. 
And we certainly could have done without the author glibly offering the 
quasi-total demolition of our work “… in support of their welcome ambition to 
raise the methodological standards of research in this field” (Pöchhacker this 
issue: 163). Are we supposed to feel honoured by this insult to our intelligence? 
Yet still not satisfied, Pöchhacker turns the dagger in the wound by stating that 
“Understandably, these colleagues would rather not see their published work 
become an object of methodological criticism.” Well, Pöchhacker certainly 
notches up full marks in insight and sensitivity on that score, yet at the end of 
the day, what we find most objectionable, is not so much the criticism itself, but 
the rather patronizing tone in which it is couched. Criticize us by all means, but 
superciliousness we can do without. As far as survey research is concerened, 
Pöchhacker is still in an early stage of infancy. 
6. Beams of light? 
Last, but certainly not least, despite our criticisms of the studies mentioned, we 
would like to emphasize our respect for all those researchers who have tried 
their hand at field work. Our harshness towards these people has been dictated 
by the need to demonstrate that if we “Unwittingly … provide material for a 
case study of methodological rigor in quality research” (Pöchhacker this issue: 
163) others provide just as much, if not more so and presumably, until this 
moment, just as inadvertently. Nevertheless, however faulty and elementary 
their instruments, only people who have actually rolled up their sleeves and 
personally tried to obtain answers from complete strangers will have 
experienced the blood, sweat and tears behind each single return. Which 
naturally makes the whys and wherefores of less than rigorous sampling 
understandable. Of course, it is simpler to announce a questionnaire to a 
roomful of delegates than to stop them one by one thus chancing a higher risk of 
refusal. But then we must be aware that the sample is no longer random. 
Delia Chiaro – Giuseppe Nocella 196 
Similarly, asking friends and colleagues to take part in studies is equally open to 
criticism. It was precisely this type of nonchalant way of surveying that made us 
want to contribute with our five (Euro)cents. 
We would like nonetheless to express our discomfort with the present 
response. This time we are fully aware of our heavy handedness regarding the 
work of others. But if originally we had been vague, here we have had to argue 
our case as clearly as possible and hopefully readers and, above all, the 
researchers involved will understand that we had no option. From our point of 
view, Pöchhacker’s critique of our work was short sighted and in places 
erroneous.  
Re-reading the QBQR in IS in preparation for this reply, the lack of 
knowledge in the tools and methods of the social sciences is self evident. 
Measurement scales, sampling frames, statistics and statistical tests are 
constantly defective and studies are strikingly self-referential. If the field of IS 
aims to “earn the academic recognition it deserves” (Pöchhacker this issue: 164) 
at excellence in research design and applications, then it should be open to the 
views and criticism of outsiders who are free of the institutional shackles of 
unassailable individuals within that group. We hope to have shown that no one 
is exempt from developing clay feet. Having said that, if the field wishes to 
remain self-referential, then so be it.  
However, we wish to conclude on a positive note. The present essay is a 
display of academic argument in which we have criticized rather old studies. 
Perhaps the time has come to let sleeping dogs lie. And perhaps it is also time 
that translation and interpreting faculties began introducing courses in research 
design and statistics so that students wishing to embark upon the fascinating 
field of research are well equipped to do so with a working knowledge of how to 
go about it. Perhaps now is the moment to learn from disciplines which have 
been working in social research for decades. In fact, in more recent publications, 
it is highly uplifting to find that IS scholars are beginning to look tentatively 
outside IS towards the social sciences for insights into quality research (e.g. 
Kurz 2003). Surely, if there is something to be learnt from the successful 
marketing of a good or a service it is the collaboration of experts with diverse 
expertise who together construct high quality products and facilities. If it is truly 
excellence which interpreters desire for themselves and their clients in the real 
world, then the path of interdisciplinary research of practitioners and objective 
outsiders is surely a good one. If, on the other hand, the issue of quality is to be 
restricted to the philosophical argument and mutual back patting of a few, then 
let it remain trapped and stagnant in its ivory towers.  
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